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Abstract   A biomass model of a wild salmon (Salmo salar) river recreational
fishery is formulated, and the ways in which economic and biological conditions
influence harvesting, stock size, profitability, and the benefit of the anglers are
studied. The demand for recreational angling is met by fishing permits supplied
by myopic profit-maximizing landowners. Both price-taking and monopolistic
supply is studied. These schemes are contrasted with an overall river manage-
ment regime. Gear regulations in the recreational fishery, but also the
commercial fishery, are analysed under the various management scenarios, and
the paper concludes with some policy implications. One novel result is that im-
posing gear restrictions in the recreational fishery may have the exact opposite
stock effects of imposing restrictions on the marine harvest.
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“River fisheries are a natural resource of a very limited character, and
would be rapidly exhausted, if allowed to be used by every one without
restraint” (John Stuart Mill 1848).
Introduction
There has not been much good news concerning the abundance of wild salmon
stocks in the North Atlantic during the last few decades. Stock development has
been especially disappointing in the 1990s due to a combination of factors, such as
sea temperature, diseases, and human activity, both in the spawning streams and
through the strong growth of sea farming (NASCO 2004). Norwegian rivers are the
most important spawning rivers for the East Atlantic stock, and about 30% of the re-
maining stock spawns here. The wild salmon are harvested by commercial and
recreational fisheries. The marine harvest is mainly commercial, whereas the harvest
in the spawning rivers is recreational. As the wild stock began to decrease during the
1980s, the Norwegian government imposed gear restrictions to limit the commercial
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harvest. Drift net fishing was banned in 1989, and the fishing season of bend nets
was restricted. At the same time, the fishing season in the spawning rivers was lim-
ited. However, despite all of these measures to rebuild the stock, the abundance of
salmon seems to be only half the level experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. The
same sad picture is observed other places (NASCO 2004).
After drift net fishing was banned, catches by commercial fishermen and recre-
ational anglers have been approximately equal (NOU 1999). In this article, however,
we focus on the recreational fishery, as it is more important from an economic per-
spective. The value of the marine harvest is more or less directly related to the meat
value, whereas recreational fishermen typically pay for the right to fish, and the high
willingness to pay implies that the payment per kilo of fish caught is several times
the meat value (NOU 1999). Altogether, there remain about 500 streams with
spawning Atlantic salmon in Norway, and sport fishing is an important recreational
activity. In addition, the indirect economic effects from the river fishery are of great
importance to many local communities (Fiske and Aas 2001).
The aim of this article is to analyse how biological and economic factors affect
harvest, stock growth, the economic benefit, and the distribution of economic ben-
efits among anglers and landowners in a representative Norwegian salmon river. A
bioeconomic biomass model is formulated where the demand for fishing is given in
number of days, whereas the quality of the river, approximated by average catch per
fishing day, shifts demand up. On the supply side, there are a fixed number of land-
owners, treated as a single agent, managing the fishery under the assumption of
profit maximization. Two different management regimes are studied; price-taking
and monopolistic behaviour. Under both these schemes, it is assumed that the man-
agement is myopic. There may be various reasons leading to myopic management;
most important is the presence of insecure property rights due to the marine harvest
(see below). These management schemes are then contrasted with an overall river
management solution. The model is illustrated by using ecological data from the
river Imsa located on the southwestern coast of Norway (Rogaland County).
There is a substantial literature on recreational fishing.1 The present model essen-
tially builds on the sequential harvesting model of Charles and Reed (1985), but it is
also related to Laukkanen (2001) who analyses the northern Baltic salmon fishery. We
depart from Laukkanen’s paper as we study the recreational river fishery in more detail,
while keeping the marine fishery in the background. In addition, and in contrast to
Laukkanen (2001) and Charles and Reed (1985), the control variable in our analysis is
fishing permits, not catch. Moreover, we differ from the traditional recreational fishing
literature in that we explicitly consider the distribution of benefits between anglers and
landowners (but see Anderson 1980b; Skonhoft and Logstein 2003). The effects of gear
regulations in the commercial and the recreational fisheries are also analysed.
The present model is closely related to Skonhoft and Logstein (2003), but they
analysed monopolistic management in biological equilibrium only. However, vari-
ous management schemes do not influence only harvest and stock level, but also the
dynamics. One typical difference between small and medium/large salmon rivers
seems to be that the yearly stock and catch statistics fluctuate much more from year
to year in the small ones (Statistics Norway 2006). Since small rivers typically are
managed more in accordance with a price-taking than a monopolistic management
1 The demand for sport fishing has been analysed and estimated in a wide range of papers, including
Anderson (1980b, 1983, 1993); Layman, Boyce, and Criddle (1996); Green, Moss, and Spreen (1997);
Provencher and Bishop (1997); and Schuhmann (1998). Studies of recreational versus commercial fish-
eries include McConnell and Sutinen (1979); Bishop and Samples (1980); Anderson (1980a); Rosenman
(1991); Sutinen (1993); Cook and McGaw (1996); and Laukkanen (2001). Policy measures are analysed
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scheme (Fiske and Aas 2001), an unexplored question is if the different dynamic
patterns may be an expected outcome due to different management regimes.
Analysing fluctuations and dynamic patterns in a deterministic model means that we
are interested in how steady state may be reached when facing an initial situation of
overfishing or when certain factors (environmental or economic) have temporarily
shocked the system out of equilibrium.
Although the application is for an Atlantic salmon recreational fishery, the
model yields general results with policy relevance to other recreational fisheries in,
say, Scandinavia and North America. For example, while Norwegian Atlantic
salmon fisheries are predominated by private ownership, the state is also a large
landowner in some rivers. On the contrary, while national or state authorities pro-
vide most fishing permits in the USA, exceptions where riparian right holders
possess exclusive rights to fish also exist (see Murphy and Stephenson 1999). More-
over, access and effort limitations, such as closed seasons and closed areas, are
increasingly used in the USA in both fresh and saltwater recreational fisheries (Cox
and Walters 2002, p. 117). The variety of management regimes in recreational fish-
ing typically ranges from the type characterised by strong rights to public access of
fishing opportunities in New Zealand as opposed to the strong protection of private
property rights in all freshwater fisheries in Scotland. However, in the recreational
fishing literature, management regimes are typically adopted from the commercial
fishing literature focusing on open-access and sole-owner schemes only.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we formulate
the biological model and introduce harvesting. Then, the cost and benefit functions
are formulated, and today’s practice of myopic management is analysed based on
price-taking and monopolistic landowners, respectively. Next, we study the overall
river management solution. Finally, numerical analysis and results are presented be-
fore the article concludes with some policy recommendations.
Population Dynamics and Biological Equilibrium
Building on Charles and Reed (1985), we consider a salmon sub-population whose
size in biomass (or number of fish) at the beginning of the fishing season in year t is
Xt. Both a marine and a river fishery influence the population during the spawning
migration from its offshore environment to the coast and its parent river (‘the home
river’) where reproduction takes place. A fixed fraction, σ, of the adult stock is as-
sumed to leave the offshore habitat each year (Mills 1989) (see figure 1). The
marine fishery first influences the stock, because marine harvest takes place in
fjords and inlets before the salmon reaches its spawning river. For a marine harvest
rate 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, hσXt fish are removed from the population. The escapement to the
home river is accordingly (1 – h)σXt. The river fishery exploits this spawning popula-
tion along the upstream migration. When the river harvesting fraction is 0 ≤ yt ≤ 1,
the river escapement is (1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt. This spawning stock yields a subsequent
recruitment R[(1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt] to next year’s stock. It is assumed that the stock-
recruitment relationship, R(.), is purely compensating so that R′ > 0 (more details
below).2 The fraction of the recruits that survive is s2. When a further (quite small)
2 As the juveniles usually spend several years in the river before they start their downstream migration
and eventually join the offshore stock, the model represents a simplification of reality. This is due to the
biomass approach, which could be made more realistic by a more detailed ecological model, including
the age structure of the stock. Strictly speaking, therefore, each step in the time index, t, represents an
average salmon generation life time (which varies between three and five years in different rivers) rather
than one year. Laukkanen (2001) applies the same biomass approach.Olaussen and Skonhoft 276
proportion, s1, of the spawners survive to be part of the stock the next year, and a
proportion, s0, of the nonspawners staying offshore similarly survives (see Mills
1989 and 2000 for details), the population dynamics follows as:
 Xt+1 = s2R((1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt) + s1 (1 – yt)(1 – h)σXt + s0(1 – σ)Xt .  (1)
Generally, when a single fish population is harvested sequentially by separate
fisheries, as here, there will be conflicts between the different groups of harvesters
because the size of h will influence the size of yt, but also vice versa through next
year’s fisheries. Hence, there will be reciprocal externalities present (see McKelvey
1997). The present analysis is, however, restricted to studying the exploitation of the
river fishery while taking the marine salmon fishery as given. The main reason for
doing so is that we want to analyse the sport fishery thoroughly, as this is by far the
most important part of the salmon fishery (see above). However, we do examine
how the marine harvest affects the harvest and benefits of the recreational fishery by
analysing shifts in the (exogenous) marine harvesting rate. These shifts may be in-
terpreted as changing restrictions imposed on the marine fishery; e.g., changes in
season length, size and type of nets, and so forth. Therefore, given the marine har-
vest rate, we focus on the river offtake Yt = yt(1 – h)σXt.
As discussed further in the next section, the market for the salmon recreational
fishery is related to the number of daily fishing permits, Dt, sold throughout the sea-
son (June–August). Accordingly, the number of fishing permits, or the number of
fishing days spent in the river, represents the effort in the river fishery. We assume a
harvesting function of the Schaefer type:
Yt = qDt(1 – h)σXt, (2)
where q is the productivity (‘catchability’) coefficient related to the type of fishing
Figure 1.  Harvest and Reproduction SchemeAtlantic Salmon Recreational Fishing 277
equipment (fly fishing, fishing lure, spinning bait, and so forth)3 and with (1 – h)σXt
as the stock available for sport fishing (see above). When combining the catch func-
tion (2) with the river offtake (Yt = yt(1 – h)σXt), we find the harvesting fraction in
the river simply as yt = qDt. Inserted into the population dynamic equation (1), the
stock growth yields Xt+1 = s2R[(1 – qDt)(1 – h)σXt] + s1 (1 – qDt)(1 – h)σXt + s0(1 – σ)Xt.
This may also be written as Xt+1 = F(Xt, Dt), where ∂F/∂Dt = FD < 0 holds. In addi-
tion, we find that 0 < FX < 1 under the present assumption of a pure compensatory
stock-recruitment function (R′ > 0).
When Xt = Xt+1 = X and Dt = D, the stock-effort equilibrium is written as:
X = F(X,D). (3)
Implicitly, this biological equilibrium condition defines the equilibrium stock as a
function of the number of fishing days. Differentiation yields (1 – FX)dX = FDdD.
Hence, more effort means a smaller stock. Therefore, the stock-effort equilibrium
condition is negatively sloped in the X – D diagram, and, where D = 0, it produces
the highest possible stock level, whereas X = 0 gives the highest number of fishing
days incompatible with an equilibrium fishery (see figure 2). We find that the bio-
logical equilibrium shifts inwards if the marine harvest rate, h, shifts up. This is in
line with intuition, since in order to keep a given stock, X, a higher marine harvest
rate must be accompanied by a reduced effort in the river. A higher catchability co-
efficient, q, shifts the biological equilibrium condition inwards for the same reason.
That is, in order to keep a given stock size, increased catch efficiency must be ac-
companied by reduced effort.
Demand and Cost Functions
We now introduce a market for sport fishing in our representative spawning river.
On the demand side, there is a large number of potential recreational anglers, while
there is a fixed number of landowners along the river who are given the right (by the
State) to sell fishing permits (NOU 1999). These landowners are treated as a single
agent, as they in most instances join forces and establish a river owner association.
The competition from landowners in other rivers may vary. Crucial factors are the
distance, which may vary between some few kilometres to over hundred kilometres,
transportation costs, and various river-specific attributes. In most instances, the mar-
ket situation is probably something between price-taking and monopoly behaviour
(Skonhoft and Logstein 2003). However, we study both these market forms as styl-
ized extremes. The price-taking case typically corresponds to the situation in fjords
holding many salmon rivers competing for the same anglers, while the monopolistic
case, on the other hand, corresponds to fjords with just one dominating river.4
As mentioned, the market for salmon recreational fishing is related to the num-
ber of daily fishing permits sold (see McConnell and Sutinen 1989; Anderson 1983,
1993; and Lee 1996). Fishing permits may be for one day, one week, or a whole sea-
3 The assumption of a fixed catchability coefficient has been subject to criticism. Arrenguin-Sanchez
(1996) provides a review. A related issue is the linearity assumption in number of fishing days in the
catch function, cf. the above Schaefer function. Among others, Anderson (1993), Homans and Ruliffson
(1999), and Woodward and Griffin (2003) formulate recreational fishing models where this assumption
is relaxed. However, the linearity assumption yields a simple, tractable relationship between the harvest-
ing fraction and effort (main text below).
4 An example of this first case is the fjord Nordfjord on the western coast with the rivers Strynelva,
Loenelva, Oldenelva, Gloppenelva, Gjengedalsvassdraget, Straumeelva, Hopeelva, and Eidselva. The
fjord Altafjord with the river Alta in the far northern part of Norway is an example of the other case.Olaussen and Skonhoft 278
son. However, we collapse all these possibilities into one-day permits only, so that
the market demand is directly expressed in number of day permits, Dt, and is in a
standard manner decreasing in permit price. The sport fishermen’s notion of the
river quality is assumed to influence demand as well. In line with McConnell and
Sutinen (1979), it is expressed as the average catch per day, and for a given number
of fishing days, a higher catch per day shifts the demand function upwards.5
The inverse market demand for fishing licenses is given as:
PP D v tt t = (,) , (4)
where Pt is the fishing permit price per day, and vt is the demand-induced catch per
day.6 In the present exposition, the demand is the residual after potential travel costs
have been subtracted. We have vt = θQt and, where catch per day (as a quality mea-
Figure 2.  Economic and Biological Equilibria
Notes: X is stock size in number of salmon, D is fishing effort in number of fishing days. Superscript P
denotes myopic price taking landowners, superscript M denotes myopic monopolistic landowners, and
superscript * denotes overall management.
5 It is tacitly assumed that the anglers are homogeneous in all relevant aspects of the model (see Ander-
son 1993 that allows for heterogeneous anglers). However, as pointed out by one of the reviewers, relax-
ing this assumption may produce different welfare results, as different anglers may react differently to
both price and quality changes.
6 The implicit assumption underlying this demand function is that the recreational participants know the
current year’s stock size and how it translates into catch per day. A lagged model where the expected
catch is based on previous years catch rates, is an alternative formulation. Such a demand function will
complicate the dynamics of the model (we will then at least have a second-order non-linear difference
equation, see below). However, under quite mild conditions, it will not affect the equilibrium (see
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sure) from the catch function (2) is seen to be proportional to the river escapement,
Qt = Yt / Dt = q(1 – h)σXt . The parameter θ > 0 indicates how catch per day trans-
lates into demand. Obviously, the quality effect will vary between rivers, and it may
change over time. For these and others reasons, it is difficult to assess the strength
of the quality effect, but on the whole, we may interpret θ as a parameter measuring
how important the catch is compared to other factors influencing demand.7 Hence, in
addition to PD < 0, we have Pv > 0.
When inserting catch per day into the inverse demand condition (4), the current
profit of the landowner is:
πtt t t t PD v D CD = − (,) () , (5)
where C(Dt) is the cost function, covering fixed as well as variable costs with C′(Dt) > 0
and C″(Dt) ≥ 0. Fixed costs include various types of costs associated with preparing
the fishery (constructing tracks, fishing huts, and so forth), whereas variable costs
include the costs of organizing the fishing permit sales together with enforcement.
The planning horizon of the landowner is important. As there are many rivers
and landowners, various planning horizons may be present. We will compare long-
term planning in the case of an overall river manager with myopic landowners. This
is not to say that all landowners are myopic. However, to cultivate this difference,
we consider a myopic landowner only, meaning that the landowner (i.e., the land-
owner association), supplies fishing permits in the given river based on current
economic and biological conditions. There may be various reasons leading to myo-
pic management; most important is the presence of insecure property rights due to
the marine harvest. Other factors, such as ecological and environmental uncertain-
ties (which are not taken into account in the present analysis), are also of
importance.8 The traditional view that even a small number of spawners is sufficient
to fully recruit a salmon river may play a role as well. Such myopic behaviour
seems to be in accordance with the stylized facts management situation in the Nor-
wegian salmon river fishery (Skonhoft and Logstein 2003) and implies that
exploitation takes place under a kind of unregulated common property rights struc-
ture (see Bromley 1991 for an excellent treatment). This is the same resource
management scheme studied in numerous papers (e.g., Brander and Taylor 1998).
Myopic exploitation is studied both under the price-taking and monopolistic land-
owner assumption and is, as mentioned, compared with the long-term planning of an
overall river manager.9
7 Using this simple demand function obviously means that many factors (income, average size of the
fish caught, accommodations, congestion, and so forth) are neglected. However, our formulation seems
to capture two of the most important demand elements. In a Norwegian survey, 92% of the sport fisher-
men reported that the quality of the river with respect to average catch per day was important. In addi-
tion, 72% reported that the price of fishing permits was important (Fiske and Aas 2001).
8 In a Norwegian survey, 73% of the river owners reported that stock uncertainty was a very important
reason for not investing in salmon fishing tourism (Birkelund, Lein, and Aas 2000).
9 Note that this is not the same as the classical open-access solution. In the classical open-access situa-
tion, more fishermen enter the fishery until the rent is dissipated. If the productivity of the fishermen is
equal, there will be no rent at all, while an intra marginal rent is present when productivity differs. Un-
der myopic conditions, the landowner (i.e., the landowner association) simply maximises current profit
while taking the stock as given; i.e., the stock effect is ignored. However, the profit may be zero under
this assumption as well, and this certainly happens under the combination of price taking behaviour and
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Price-Taking Landowner
First, we look at the situation where fishing permits are supplied under price-taking
behaviour, for example because there are many rivers located in the fjord. When
also supplying fishing permits under myopic conditions, the landowner maximizes
the current profit [equation (5)] with respect to the number of fishing permits, while
taking the price as well as the stock as given. The first-order condition is:
PD v C D tt t (,) – () . ′ = 0 (6)
This condition defines the function Dt = DP(Xt) (superscript P is for price-taking
behaviour). When inserted into the population dynamic equation (1), or Xt+1 =
F(Xt,Dt), we obtain Xt+1 = F[Xt, DP(Xt)]. This is a first-order non-linear difference
equation that, in principle, may exhibit all types of dynamics (see the classical May
1976). Therefore, the present myopic management scheme does not automatically
secure any long-term equilibrium or steady state. However, it is a strong demand-
side stabilizing effect present as demand responds to the stock size through the
quality factor. On the other hand, parameters in the stock-recruitment and harvesting
functions may work in a destabilizing manner (more on this below).
Supposing that a steady state exists, the first-order condition (6) represents the
economic equilibrium condition P(D, v) – C′(D) = 0, and where differentiation
yields [PD – C″]dD = –θq(1 – h)σ PvdX. As the left-hand side is negative due to the
second-order condition for maximum, we find this equilibrium condition, if existing,
to be positively sloped in the X – D plane. In line with intuition, a higher stock size
is associated with more fishing days in economic equilibrium (figure 2). Therefore,
the economic equilibrium condition simply tells us that at a given price a higher fish
stock means that more fishing permits are sold. Moreover, this means that the inter-
section with the negatively sloped biological equilibrium condition (3) represents
the (unique) bioeconomic equilibrium XP, DP under the present myopic price-taking
management scheme.
The total river surplus comprises the landowner profit and the angler surplus
(consumer surplus). At a given point of time, as well as in the steady state, the an-
gler surplus is given by the area under the inverse demand function for a given stock
size (or the given demand-induced catch per day). A higher stock size for the same
market price yields a higher angler surplus as the inverse demand function shifts up.
However, because the stock is not controlled by the landowners or the anglers, XP is
considered to be an externality determining the value of the angler surplus, as well
as the profit (Anderson 1983). This will also be the case outside the bioeconomic
equilibrium.
Throughout the reminder of the article, two important comparative static, as
well as dynamic, effects are analysed; shifts in the marine harvest rate, h, and the
catchability coefficient, q. As mentioned above, a shift in the marine harvest rate
may be interpreted as changes in the restrictions imposed on the marine fishery by
the State. Likewise, a shift in the catchability coefficient can be related to new gear
regulations in the river fishery and where, say, a reduction in q may be due to ban-
ning of different bait types.10
It can easily be shown that a higher marine harvest rate, h, shifts the economic
equilibrium condition outwards, meaning that lower effort is compatible with the
same fish stock. As a higher marine harvest rate shifts the biological equilibrium in-
10 Fiske and Aas (2001) present an overview of the efficiency of different angling methods in recre-
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wards (see the Population Dynamics and Biological Equilibrium section above), we
find that the number of fishing permits decreases, whereas the equilibrium stock ef-
fect is generally ambiguous. If the demand response is weak, the stock will decrease
with a higher marine harvest rate, h. On the other hand, if the demand response is
strong; that is, the quality parameter θ has a high value, we may find that the equi-
librium stock increases (more on this in the numerical example below). An increased
catchability coefficient q (e.g., relaxed gear restrictions) shifts the economic equilib-
rium condition inwards. Again, this follows intuition, since a higher catchability
increases demand through increased quality of the fishing experience (increased
catch per fishing day). Hence, for a given stock size, X, increased catchability is ac-
companied by greater effort. As the biological equilibrium condition also shifts
inwards with a higher q (see Population Dynamics and Biological Equilibrium sec-
tion above), we find that the equilibrium stock (if an equilibrium exists) decreases,
while the effect on the number of fishing days is ambiguous. It can be shown that
the sign of this effort effect (number of fishing days) depends on the quality demand
response through θ. If the demand response is strong; that is, the quality parameter θ
has a high value, the possibility of a positive effort effect increases. More generally,
the shift in economic equilibrium pulls in the direction of a higher effort, while the
shift in biological equilibrium pulls in the other direction. In any case, we find that
relaxing the gear restrictions in the recreational fishery always decreases the salmon
stock, while relaxing the restrictions in the marine fishery, and thereby increasing
the marine harvest rate, h, may in fact increase the stock through reduced recre-
ational demand (see the numerical section below).
The total surplus and the surplus distribution between the landowner and the an-
glers will be influenced both by h and q. However, the outcomes are quite complex
because of the quality effect in the demand function. If a higher marine harvest frac-
tion is accompanied by a smaller stock, together with a lower number of fishing
permits, angler surplus decreases. This may also be true for landowner profit (but
not with constant marginal cost, see below). However, which components are re-
duced most depends on circumstances. The picture is even more complex if a higher
h is accompanied by more salmon (more on this in the numerical analysis).
Monopolistic Landowner
We now study the other stylised management scheme where the landowner (i.e., the
landowner association) acts as a monopolistic supplier of fishing permits. As men-
tioned above, there may be various reasons leading to monopolistic myopic
management. The actual river is then typically located far away from other rivers, so
it is possible to exercise market power. At the same time, insecure property rights
due to the marine harvest activity and the traditional view that only a few spawners
are required to fully recruit a salmon river, both pull in the direction of myopic
behaviour and neglecting the effect on the future stock. Under monopolistic and
myopic behaviour, maximizing equation (5) with respect to Dt yields the first-order
condition:
PD v P D v D C D tt D tt t (,) (,)– () . + ′ = 0 (7)
Equation (7) defines the function Dt = DM(Xt) (superscript M is for monopolistic
behaviour). Inserted into the population growth function (1), or Xt+1 = F(Xt, Dt), we
again obtain a first-order non-linear difference equation. It is difficult to say how
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monopolistic management is more conducive to stock conservation (see below), one
may suspect that fluctuations, if any, will be more modest than in the price-taking case.
As explained above, such fluctuations may be due to a temporal situation of overfishing.
Supposing that a steady state exists, the first-order condition (7) yields the mo-
nopolistic economic equilibrium condition P(D, v) + PD(D, v)D – C′(D) = 0.
Differentiation gives [2PD + DPDD – C″]dD = –θq(1 – h)σ[Pv + DPDv]dX, where the
term in the bracket on the left-hand side again is negative due to the second-order
condition. Under the reasonable assumption that the quality effect dominates the po-
tentially negative cross effect in the demand function, so that [Pv + DPDv] > 0, we
find that the economic equilibrium condition again is positively sloped in the X–D
diagram. However, it is less positively sloped than the economic equilibrium condi-
tion under price-taking behaviour. The intuition is straightforward as a higher fish
stock increases the demand for fishing permits, as in the case of the myopic price-
taking landowner. Since increasing demand is accompanied by a higher permit price
in the monopolistic case, the permit sale increases less than under price-taking
behaviour. Notice also that the intercepts of the first-order conditions (6) and (7)
with the X-axis are the same (again, see figure 2). For these reasons, as expected, the
bioeconomic equilibrium stock is higher and the number of supplied permits is
lower than under price-taking behaviour; that is, XM > XP and DM < DP. Hence, in
accordance with most natural resource economic models, the monopolistic exploita-
tion regime is more resource conserving than the price-taking regime (e.g., Hanley,
Shogren, and White 1997).
While the monopolistic scheme yields more fish and less effort in bioeconomic
equilibrium than the price-taking scheme, the total surplus will not necessarily be
higher. The reason is that the quality effect in the demand function works like an ex-
ternality (see above). Hence, higher profit may be dominated by a reduced angler
surplus when moving from the myopic monopolistic scheme to the myopic price-
taking scheme (cf. the numerical results). Depending on how the demand curve
shifts, it is also possible, at least in theory, that angler surplus can increase when
moving to the monopolistic scheme.
The Overall River Management Solution
The above two myopic management regimes are now contrasted with the overall
river management solution (hereafter referred to as overall management), where the
goal of the manager is to maximize the present value overall economic benefit, com-
prising landowner profit and angler surplus (consumer surplus), while taking the




















subject to the population dynamics Xt+1 = F(Xt, Dt). ρ = 1/(1+δ) is the discount fac-
tor, with δ > 0 as the (yearly) discount rate.
The current value Hamiltonian of this problem reads:
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where λt > 0 is the resource shadow price (see Conrad and Clark 1995). The first-
order conditions yield:
∂∂ = →− ′ += + HD P D v C D F X D tt t t t D t t /( , ) ( ) ( , ) 00 1 ρλ (8)
and
ρλ λ ρλ λ tt t tt HX ++ − = −∂ ∂ → − 11 / (9)
= −− − − + PDv q h D F X D vt t t t Xtt (,) ( ) [(, ) ] θσ ρ λ 11 1
when assuming an interior solution (a positive supply of fishing permits at the
steady state).
The interpretation of control condition (8) is that fishing permits should be sup-
plied up to the point where the licence price is equal to the marginal cost of the
suppliers plus the cost of reduced stock growth, evaluated at the shadow price.
Equation (9) is the portfolio condition governing the change of the resource price.
Basically, it states that the biomass should be maintained so that the change in the
net natural growth is equal to the (shadow) price change, adjusted for the discount
factor. As the Hamiltonian is not linear in the control, we typically find that the dy-
namics will not be of the Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) (see the numerical
analysis).
Suppose that a steady state exists and is reachable from X0. Evaluating equation
(8) at the steady state implies λ = –[P(D, vt) – C′(D)]/ρFD(X,D). Substituting equa-
tion (8) into equation (9), also in the steady state, and rearranging, we obtain the
discrete time golden rule condition:
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which states that the internal rate of return of the resource should be equal to the
external rate of return (1 + δ). The golden rule condition, together with the biologi-
cal equilibrium condition (3), yields the overall management steady state X* and D*.
This steady solution may be compared to the steady states (if existing) under
myopic management. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the control condition
(8) in economic equilibrium will have the same intercept with the X axis as in the
price taking and monopolistic regimes because the shadow price of the stock is zero
whenever there is no permit sale.11 Furthermore, it is seen directly that it will be lo-
cated further outward than the price-taking equation (6) in equilibrium, because
′ < FD 0  and λ > 0 (again, see figure 2). Therefore, we can conclude that the steady-
state stock level will be higher and the number of fishing permits will be lower than
under the myopic price-taking scheme; that is, X* > XP and D* < DP. Consequently,
the fishing permit price following myopic price-taking management will always be
below the overall management solution. Comparing with the monopolistic myopic
solution (7) indicates that the overall management solution, depending on the differ-
ence (PDD – ρλFD), will be located between the price-taking solution and the
monopolistic solution if |PDD| > |ρλFD| and further outwards than the myopic mo-
nopolistic solution if |PDD| < |ρλFD|. The intuition is clear as a high discount factor;
i.e., a low discount rate and a high shadow price of the stock both pull in the direc-
11 When evaluating equation (9) at steady state, we find λ(1 + ρFX) = Pvθqσ(1 – h)D after a small rear-
rangement. Hence, no permit sale and D = 0 is accompanied by λ = 0.Olaussen and Skonhoft 284
tion of the overall management being more stock conserving than the myopic mo-
nopolistic regime. On the other hand, a low discount factor or a low shadow price of
the stock pulls the overall management in the direction of the outcome of the myo-
pic price taking management scheme.
According to the discussion above, it is not possible to infer anything definite
about the distribution of benefits between the anglers and landowners. The total cur-
rent surplus in the myopic equilibria may be above that of the overall management
equilibrium solution due to discounting.12 It can be shown that a higher periodic dis-
count rate will increase the slope of the control condition (8) in equilibrium.
Consequently, as discussed above, the steady state of the overall management solu-
tion approaches the price-taking myopic management solution. In the limiting case
of δ = ∞, we find that the overall management solution coincides with the equilib-
rium price-taker myopic management situation. The steady-state total surplus and
the distribution of the surplus are then equal in these regimes. On the other hand,
when δ = 0, the steady state of the overall management solution coincides with the
problem of total current surplus maximization in biological equilibrium.13 In this
case, the total current surplus is obviously higher than under the myopic price-tak-
ing scheme. However, for intermediate values of the discount rate, the total current
surplus may be higher in the price taking case due to discounting. This may also be
so when comparing the overall management with the myopic monopolistic scheme.
Numerical Analysis and Results14
Data and Specific Functional Forms
The above analysis will now be illustrated numerically with data from the river
Imsa. This is a typically small, but productive, salmon river located on the south-
western coast of Norway (for details, see Hansen, Jonsson, and Jonsson 1996). We
start by specifying the functional forms. The stock-recruitment function is given as
the Cushing curve version of the Shepherd function (Shepherd 1982; King 1995):



























where (1 – qDt)(1 – h)σXt is the spawning biomass (see Population Dynamics and
Biological Equilibrium section above), r > 0 is the intrinsic growth rate interpreted
as the maximum number of recruits per spawning salmon, and K > 0 is the stock
level for which density-dependent mortality equals density-independent mortality.
The compensation parameter, γ > 0, indicates to what extent density independent ef-
fects compensate for changes in stock size. The parameter values are estimated by
12 However, the present-value total surplus is obviously higher under the overall management than the
present-value total surplus of the myopic solutions for the same time period and discount rate.
13 These results are the same as we find in the standard Clark harvesting model (see Munro and Scott
1985), except that the infinite discount rate yields the so-called open-access solution, while here it ap-
plies to the slightly different regime of myopic price taking exploitation (cf. also footnote 8).
14 The dynamic optimization was performed with the Solver tool bundled with Microsoft Excel. The
code is made available under Numerical analysis fisheries management – Salmon management at
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Hansen, Jonsson, and Jonsson (1996) for Imsa and are reported in the table 1 (see
also Appendix). Here, it can be seen that we have γ < 1 and the density-dependent
effect is weak. Consequently, as already indicated, the stock-recruitment function
(11) is increasing for all levels of the spawning population, R′ > 0.
The inverse demand function is specified as linear. In addition, it is assumed
that the quality of the river, approximated by demand induced catch per day, Vt =
θq(1 – h)σXt, shifts the demand uniformly up:
PvD ttt = αβ –. (12)
Accordingly, the choke price, α, gives the maximum willingness to pay when the
quality-translated catch is one fish per day, whereas β reflects the price response in
a standard manner. The cost function is linear as well:
Ccc D tt =+ 0 , (13)
so that c0 is the fixed cost, while c is the constant marginal cost of providing a fish-
ing permit (see Demand and Cost Functions). Based on the above demand and cost
functions, we find that the first-order condition under the myopic price taking and
monopolistic schemes are avt – βDt = c and avt – 2βDt = c, respectively. It is there-
fore a linear, increasing relationship between stock size and the number of fishing
days, and the slope of the economic equilibrium condition under price taking will be
two times higher than that of the monopolistic case (cf. also figure 2). The economic




r Maximum recruitment per spawning salmon 124 (smolts per
spawning salmon)
K Stock level where density-dependent mortality 5.3 (number of
    dominates density-independent factors spawning salmon)
γ Degree to which extent density-independent 0.77
    effects compensate for stock changes
σ Fraction of non-spawners 0.85
s0 Survival rate non-spawners 0.5
s1 Share of salmon spawning twice 0.25
s2 Survival rate, downstream smolt migration 0.4
α Reservation price when catch per day is 1 400 (NOK/salmon)
β Price effect demand 1 (NOK/day2)
c Marginal cost fishing permit sale 50 (NOK/day)
c0 Fixed cost fishing permit sale 0
q Catchability coefficient 0.0025 (1/day)
h Marine harvest rate 0.4
δ Period discount rate 0.07
θ Quality response in demand 1Olaussen and Skonhoft 286
Steady States
First, we look at the steady states. For the baseline parameter values, the steady state
will be approached smoothly under all three management schemes. It can be seen in
table 2 that the monopolistic myopic regime is somewhat more stock conserving
than the overall management regime. As demonstrated above, the reason for this is
that in order to increase profit, the monopolist reduces demand more than does the
overall manager, who accounts for the future stock value. When the landowners face
competition and act as price takers, the stock is substantially lower. On the contrary,
and consistent with this, permit sales are higher and the license price is lower. Be-
cause of the constant marginal cost assumption, the price under the price-taking
scheme just equalizes this value.
In addition, under the baseline parameter values, it can be seen that the total
surplus (angler and landowner surpluses) in the overall management and monopolis-
tic cases are equal. This happens by accident, but as noted above it is possible that
the steady-state total surplus in the myopic monopolistic case (as well as under price
taking) can exceed the overall management surplus due to discounting (see The
Overall River Management Solution). The total surplus in the myopic monopolistic
case is above that of the myopic price-taking case. As explained in the Monopolistic
Landowner section, the reason for this is the quality shift in the market demand
function. However, the anglers are substantially better off under the myopic price-




Parameter Values Price Taker Monopolist Management
X Baseline values 562 692 662
Catchability ↑ 469 623 628
D Baseline values 237 152 173
Catchability ↑ 237 166 163
P Baseline values 50 202 165
Catchability ↑ 50 216 221
v Baseline values 0.72 0.88 0.85
Catchability ↑ 0.72 1.06 1.02
LS Baseline values 0 23 20
Catchability ↑ 02 72 8
AS Baseline values 28 12 15
Catchability ↑ 28 14 13
TS Baseline values 28 35 35
Catchability ↑ 28 41 41
Notes: Stock size, X (number of salmon); number of fishing days, D; permit price, P (NOK per day); v
demand induced catch per day; landowner surplus LS (1,000 NOK); angler surplus AS (1,000 NOK); and
total surplus TS (1,000 NOK). Catchability ↑; the catchability coefficient, q, increases by 20%. Notice
that v corresponds to catch per day since θ=1 (table 1).Atlantic Salmon Recreational Fishing 287
measured as catch per day, is lowest here. Thus, the low fishing license price more
than compensates for the low quality. Note that the angler surplus is also higher un-
der the price-taking regime than under overall management.
Table 2 reports the results when the catchability coefficient increases by 20% due to
relaxed gear restrictions. Stock abundance becomes substantially lower under the price-
taking scheme while stock effects are more modest in the monopolistic case and overall
management case due to the increased fishing permit price. The catchability shift materi-
alizes into small changes in angler surplus, while landowner surplus increases most
under overall management. Moreover, since the total surplus increases with more effi-
cient fishing equipment, the opposite occurs when gear restrictions are imposed.
Table 3 demonstrates how changes in the marine harvest rate, h, affect the
steady-state river fishery, where h = 0.4 is the baseline value (see also table 2). A
higher marine harvest rate through relaxed harvesting restrictions has an ambiguous
stock effect under both myopic schemes, whereas the stock decreases under overall
management. If the quality demand effect is strong, we obtain the somewhat para-
Table 3
Steady-state Results, Different Marine Harvest Rates
Marine Harvest Rate, h
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Myopic Price-taking Management
XP 453 512 562 573 482
DP 335 298 237 145 32
PP 50 50 50 50 50
vP 0.96 0.87 0.72 0.49 0.21
LSP 00000
ASP 56 44 28 10 1
TSP 56 44 28 10 1
Myopic Monopolistic Management
XM 671 696 692 638 495
DM 260 212 152 83 17
PM 310 261 202 134 67
vM 1.43 1.18 0.88 0.54 0.21
LSM 68 45 23 7 0
ASM 34 22 12 3 0
TSM 102 67 35 10 0
Overall Management
X* 765 715 662 604 486
D* 219 202 173 116 29
P* 431 284 165 89 54
v* 1.63 1.22 0.85 0.51 0.21
LS* 83 47 20 5 1
AS* 24 20 15 7 0
TS* 107 67 35 12 1
Notes: Stock size, X (number of salmon); number of fishing days, D; permit price, P (NOK per day); v
demand induced catch per day; landowner surplus LS (1,000 NOK); angler surplus AS (1,000 NOK); and
total surplus TS (1,000 NOK). Notice that v corresponds to catch per day since θ=1 (table 1).Olaussen and Skonhoft 288
doxical result that a higher marine harvesting pressure goes hand in hand with more
fish (see Price-Taking Landowner). Note that this is the exact opposite stock effect
of that obtained by relaxing the gear restrictions in the recreational fishery under the
myopic schemes (see discussion above). Under overall management, on the other
hand, a higher h translates consistently into a smaller stock because the stock
shadow price, from a river management point of view, depends on the fish biomass
entering the river. Hence, when the marine harvest rate increases, the shadow price
decreases. A higher h generally reduces the surplus.
Dynamics
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the questions we want to reveal is whether
type of management regime can explain any dynamic differences among different
rivers; e.g., if small rivers exhibit more stock fluctuations because they are more
likely to be managed in line with a price-taking scheme. For the given specific func-
tional forms, the first-order myopic profit maximum conditions yield linear
relationships between the number of fishing days and the stock. We have Dt = DP
(Xt) = (1/β)[αvt – c] in the price-taking case and Dt = DM (Xt) = (1/2β)[αvt – c] in the
monopolistic case. Therefore, these equations, combined with the population growth
function (1), or Xt+1 = F(Xt, Dt) and the stock-recruitment function (11), yield the
first-order non-linear difference stock equations under the myopic schemes to be
studied here.
Figures 3a and b demonstrate the dynamics for the baseline parameterization of
these myopic schemes, while figure 3c shows the overall management solution. The
initial stock size is assumed to be quite modest (X0 = 50), so these transitional
growth paths demonstrate recovery from a previous situation involving serious over-
fishing, or possible deceases.15 The steady states are reached rapidly, with negligible
overshooting, and the dynamics are quite similar under all three management sce-
narios. The same dynamic pattern is found when starting out with other initial
values; e.g., with an initial stock that is very high. Hence, the dynamics is of the er-
godic type, leading to the unique steady states. Based on the examination of
different initial values, the overall management solution does not seem to be sub-
stantially different from the MRAP (see The Overall River Management Solution).
As mentioned, the basic stabilizing factor when the stock is low is the quality factor
in demand; that is, a low stock is accompanied by a modest demand and the stock
rebuilds smoothly. In the same manner, the quality factor is also stabilizing when the
stock is high, as a high stock is accompanied by a high demand that ultimately
drives the stock down.16
Although the steady states under myopic management seem to be quite stable
given the baseline parameter values, other ecological and economic conditions may
produce instability. We find that relaxing the gear restrictions and thereby increasing
the recreational fishery catchability coefficient, q, may induce all types of dynamics.
For example, the dynamics will exhibit a two-point cycle pattern (see Conrad and
Clark 1995) if q increases by 35% (see figure 4a). Furthermore, if q increases by
15 Outbreaks of Gyrodactylus salaris, Furunculosis, or sea lice infections are examples of such inci-
dences (NOU 1999).
16 One interesting expansion of the model would be to include congestion demand effects. The resulting
dynamic outcome is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, the demand effect of a stock change will
be reduced, possibly leading to larger stock fluctuations. On the other hand, ceteris paribus, the possi-
bility of demand driven stock changes will occur is reduced since demand is more stable with conges-
tion effects present.Atlantic Salmon Recreational Fishing 289
50%, the dynamics will be of the chaotic type. Such shifts will not produce cycles in
the monopolistic case, but will result in an initial overshooting (not shown). To what ex-
tent these sensitivity results are realistic is an open question. To our knowledge, there
exist no such increases in efficiency that can provide empirical evidence of such
dramatic occurrences. In addition, as congestion effects are neglected in our model,
the dynamic responses may be both more and less dramatic as discussed above.17
We have also studied the dynamics when the marine harvesting pressure
changes. Under myopic price-taking behaviour by landowners, it turns out that
lower marine harvest activity may produce instability. If gear restrictions reduce the
marine harvest pressure from the baseline level of 0.4 to 0.2, the stock exhibits
damped oscillations (figure 4b). If h shifts further down to just 0.1, the dynamics
will be of the two-point cycle type. An even further reduction to zero, interpreted as
a marine harvesting ban, leads to a chaotic pattern. Thus, the initial value of the
stock is crucial for the dynamics. The reason why low marine harvest rates work in
Figure 3.  Dynamic Paths
Notes: Baseline parameter values. Stock size, Xt, in number of salmon; effort, Dt, in number of fishing days.
17 Note also that the dynamic presented here is contingent upon the linear relationship between fishing
days and harvest as discussed above. Hence, a modification of the linearity may reduce the effect of gear
restrictions.Olaussen and Skonhoft 290
the direction of instability is that as the marine harvest rate decreases, more salmon
enter the river and produce an upward shift in the market demand function through
the quality effect. Hence, at least in the initial stage, the effect is an upward shift in
demand due to an increased willingness to pay.
Concluding Remarks
Models are only approximations of how we conceive reality, and they are only as
good as the assumptions they are based on. This article examines two myopic man-
agement regimes in a recreational river fishery and contrasts these with the overall
river management solution. The myopic assumption may seem extreme, but, on the
other hand, accepting that landowner management schemes may be more short-
sighted than the overall planner’s solution is relatively straightforward. The
potential effects of this difference are highlighted by our model, although it should
be recognised that the real-life situation may be somewhere between these extremes.
The management schemes are evaluated in terms of profitability, angler surplus, ef-
fort use, license price, and stock size. The marine harvesting activity is exogenous
throughout the analysis. Both the steady states and dynamic paths are examined. It
is generally unclear how the various harvesting schemes distribute total surplus be-
tween anglers and landowners. This hinges critically on the uncertain stock and
effort effects under the different management scenarios.
It has traditionally been argued that the recreational fishery is of minor impor-
tance to the wild Atlantic salmon stock abundance because the escapement needed
to ensure recruitment is quite low (see introduction). Thus, NASCO (2004) regards
low marine survival as the crucial factor determining the decreasing wild stock. We
offer an alternative explanation, as we have shown that even with a constant marine
survival, large stock variations and fluctuations may be due to type of river manage-
ment. Moreover, we demonstrate that an increased marine harvesting activity may,
in fact, be stock conserving under myopic management.
The analysis indicates some policy and regulation implications. First, measures
taken to reduce the marine harvesting activity may produce unclear stock effects as
Figure 4.  Dynamic Paths, Sensitivity
Notes: The catchability coefficient, q, is increased by 35% in figure a). In figure b) is the marine harvest
rate, h, decreased from 0.4 to 0.2. Stock size, Xt, in number of salmon; effort in number of fishing days, Dt.Atlantic Salmon Recreational Fishing 291
well as large stock fluctuations. The crucial factor here is how strong the demand
quality effect is. As seen, this hinges critically on the type of management scheme in
the river. In the myopic case, we find that a reduced marine harvest rate may go
hand in hand with a reduced stock. Imposing gear restrictions in the river generally
increases the stock and decreases total surplus, but this may also lead to reduced
stock fluctuations over time. Thus, imposing gear restrictions in the recreational
fishery may have the exact opposite stock effects of imposing restrictions on the ma-
rine harvest, both with respect to the sign of the effect and dynamic properties. One
additional straightforward measure to reduce fluctuations under price-taking myopic
management is to impose a tax equal to the shadow price of the stock. This would
ensure stock and effort levels equivalent to those under overall management.
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Appendix
The ecological parameter values are based on Hansen, Jonsson, and Jonsson (1996)
(see also Skonhoft and Logstein 2003), whereas some of the key economic param-
eter values are calibrated to ensure the resulting prices and catches are realistic. The
(fixed) marginal cost of the landowners, which is given as c = 50 NOK per day, is
crucial here, as is the quality response in demand, which is fixed at θ = 1. The
steady-state fishing licence price under myopic price-taking management then be-
comes 50 NOK per day, whereas catch per fishing day is 0.72 (salmon per day)
under the baseline scenario. These and other values fit reasonably well with a small
salmon river fishery according to NOU (1999) and Fiske and Aas (2001). The ma-
rine harvest rate varies considerably over time, but has declined significantly during
the last few years (see Introduction section in the main text, and NOU 1999). We use
0.4 as the baseline value. The myopic scheme then yields approximately the same
river catch (in number of salmon) as the marine catch, which again fits reasonably
well with a small river fishery.